diff --git a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go
index 22ddea105..c5379953e 100644
--- a/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go
+++ b/ipn/ipnlocal/network-lock.go
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func signNodeKey(nodeInfo tailcfg.TKASignInfo, signer key.NLPrivate) (*tka.NodeK
 		SigKind:        tka.SigDirect,
 		KeyID:          signer.KeyID(),
 		Pubkey:         p,
-		RotationPubkey: nodeInfo.RotationPubkey,
+		WrappingPubkey: nodeInfo.RotationPubkey,
 	}
 	sig.Signature, err = signer.SignNKS(sig.SigHash())
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/tka/sig.go b/tka/sig.go
index 4f881e755..5ae48b18c 100644
--- a/tka/sig.go
+++ b/tka/sig.go
@@ -33,6 +33,19 @@ const (
 	// SigRotation signature and sign it again with their rotation key. That
 	// way, SigRotation nesting should only be 2 deep in the common case.
 	SigRotation
+	// SigCredential describes a signature over a specifi public key, signed
+	// by a key in the tailnet key authority referenced by the specified keyID.
+	// In effect, SigCredential delegates the ability to make a signature to
+	// a different public/private key pair.
+	//
+	// It is intended that a different public/private key pair be generated
+	// for each different SigCredential that is created. Implementors must
+	// take care that the private side is only known to the entity that needs
+	// to generate the wrapping SigRotation signature, and it is immediately
+	// discarded after use.
+	//
+	// SigCredential is expected to be nested in a SigRotation signature.
+	SigCredential
 )
 
 func (s SigKind) String() string {
@@ -43,6 +56,8 @@ func (s SigKind) String() string {
 		return "direct"
 	case SigRotation:
 		return "rotation"
+	case SigCredential:
+		return "credential"
 	default:
 		return fmt.Sprintf("Sig?<%d>", int(s))
 	}
@@ -53,8 +68,9 @@ func (s SigKind) String() string {
 type NodeKeySignature struct {
 	// SigKind identifies the variety of signature.
 	SigKind SigKind `cbor:"1,keyasint"`
-	// Pubkey identifies the public key which is being authorized.
-	Pubkey []byte `cbor:"2,keyasint"`
+	// Pubkey identifies the key.NodePublic which is being authorized.
+	// SigCredential signatures do not use this field.
+	Pubkey []byte `cbor:"2,keyasint,omitempty"`
 
 	// KeyID identifies which key in the tailnet key authority should
 	// be used to verify this signature. Only set for SigDirect and
@@ -69,19 +85,23 @@ type NodeKeySignature struct {
 	// used as Pubkey. Only used for SigRotation signatures.
 	Nested *NodeKeySignature `cbor:"5,keyasint,omitempty"`
 
-	// RotationPubkey specifies the ed25519 public key which may sign a
-	// SigRotation signature, which embeds this one.
+	// WrappingPubkey specifies the ed25519 public key which must be used
+	// to sign a Signature which embeds this one.
 	//
-	// Intermediate SigRotation signatures may omit this value to use the
-	// parent one.
-	RotationPubkey []byte `cbor:"6,keyasint,omitempty"`
+	// For SigRotation signatures multiple levels deep, intermediate
+	// signatures may omit this value, in which case the parent WrappingPubkey
+	// is used.
+	//
+	// SigCredential signatures use this field to specify the public key
+	// they are certifying, following the usual semanticsfor WrappingPubkey.
+	WrappingPubkey []byte `cbor:"6,keyasint,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// rotationPublic returns the public key which must sign a SigRotation
-// signature that embeds this signature, if any.
-func (s NodeKeySignature) rotationPublic() (pub ed25519.PublicKey, ok bool) {
-	if len(s.RotationPubkey) > 0 {
-		return ed25519.PublicKey(s.RotationPubkey), true
+// wrappingPublic returns the public key which must sign a signature which
+// embeds this one, if any.
+func (s NodeKeySignature) wrappingPublic() (pub ed25519.PublicKey, ok bool) {
+	if len(s.WrappingPubkey) > 0 {
+		return ed25519.PublicKey(s.WrappingPubkey), true
 	}
 
 	switch s.SigKind {
@@ -89,7 +109,7 @@ func (s NodeKeySignature) rotationPublic() (pub ed25519.PublicKey, ok bool) {
 		if s.Nested == nil {
 			return nil, false
 		}
-		return s.Nested.rotationPublic()
+		return s.Nested.wrappingPublic()
 
 	default:
 		return nil, false
@@ -138,15 +158,18 @@ func (s *NodeKeySignature) Unserialize(data []byte) error {
 	return dec.Unmarshal(data, s)
 }
 
-// verifySignature checks that the NodeKeySignature is authentic, certified
-// by the given verificationKey, and authorizes the given nodeKey.
+// verifySignature checks that the NodeKeySignature is authentic & certified
+// by the given verificationKey. Additionally, SigDirect and SigRotation
+// signatures are checked to ensure they authorize the given nodeKey.
 func (s *NodeKeySignature) verifySignature(nodeKey key.NodePublic, verificationKey Key) error {
-	nodeBytes, err := nodeKey.MarshalBinary()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("marshalling pubkey: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(nodeBytes, s.Pubkey) {
-		return errors.New("signature does not authorize nodeKey")
+	if s.SigKind != SigCredential {
+		nodeBytes, err := nodeKey.MarshalBinary()
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("marshalling pubkey: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(nodeBytes, s.Pubkey) {
+			return errors.New("signature does not authorize nodeKey")
+		}
 	}
 
 	sigHash := s.SigHash()
@@ -157,7 +180,7 @@ func (s *NodeKeySignature) verifySignature(nodeKey key.NodePublic, verificationK
 		}
 
 		// Verify the signature using the nested rotation key.
-		verifyPub, ok := s.Nested.rotationPublic()
+		verifyPub, ok := s.Nested.wrappingPublic()
 		if !ok {
 			return errors.New("missing rotation key")
 		}
@@ -167,15 +190,22 @@ func (s *NodeKeySignature) verifySignature(nodeKey key.NodePublic, verificationK
 
 		// Recurse to verify the signature on the nested structure.
 		var nestedPub key.NodePublic
-		if err := nestedPub.UnmarshalBinary(s.Nested.Pubkey); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("nested pubkey: %v", err)
+		// SigCredential signatures certify an indirection key rather than a node
+		// key, so theres no need to check the node key.
+		if s.Nested.SigKind != SigCredential {
+			if err := nestedPub.UnmarshalBinary(s.Nested.Pubkey); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("nested pubkey: %v", err)
+			}
 		}
 		if err := s.Nested.verifySignature(nestedPub, verificationKey); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("nested: %v", err)
 		}
 		return nil
 
-	case SigDirect:
+	case SigDirect, SigCredential:
+		if s.Nested != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature: signatures of type %v cannot nest another signature", s.SigKind)
+		}
 		switch verificationKey.Kind {
 		case Key25519:
 			if ed25519consensus.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(verificationKey.Public), sigHash[:], s.Signature) {
diff --git a/tka/sig_test.go b/tka/sig_test.go
index 7fc1a579d..c5958e322 100644
--- a/tka/sig_test.go
+++ b/tka/sig_test.go
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ func TestSigNested(t *testing.T) {
 		SigKind:        SigDirect,
 		KeyID:          k.ID(),
 		Pubkey:         oldPub,
-		RotationPubkey: rPub,
+		WrappingPubkey: rPub,
 	}
 	sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
 	nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ func TestSigNested(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
 		t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad outer signature")
 	}
+
+	// Test verification fails if the outer signature is signed with a
+	// different public key to whats specified in WrappingPubkey
+	sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with different signature")
+	}
 }
 
 func TestSigNested_DeepNesting(t *testing.T) {
@@ -128,7 +135,7 @@ func TestSigNested_DeepNesting(t *testing.T) {
 		SigKind:        SigDirect,
 		KeyID:          k.ID(),
 		Pubkey:         oldPub,
-		RotationPubkey: rPub,
+		WrappingPubkey: rPub,
 	}
 	sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
 	nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
@@ -175,6 +182,91 @@ func TestSigNested_DeepNesting(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSigCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	// Network-lock key (the key used to sign the nested sig)
+	pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
+	k := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: pub, Votes: 2}
+	// 'credential' key (the one being delegated to)
+	cPub, cPriv := testingKey25519(t, 2)
+	// The node key being certified
+	node := key.NewNode()
+	nodeKeyPub, _ := node.Public().MarshalBinary()
+
+	// The signature certifying delegated trust to another
+	// public key.
+	nestedSig := NodeKeySignature{
+		SigKind:        SigCredential,
+		KeyID:          k.ID(),
+		WrappingPubkey: cPub,
+	}
+	sigHash := nestedSig.SigHash()
+	nestedSig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
+
+	// The signature authorizing the node key, signed by the
+	// delegated key & embedding the original signature.
+	sig := NodeKeySignature{
+		SigKind: SigRotation,
+		KeyID:   k.ID(),
+		Pubkey:  nodeKeyPub,
+		Nested:  &nestedSig,
+	}
+	sigHash = sig.SigHash()
+	sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(cPriv, sigHash[:])
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verifySignature(node) failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test verification fails if the wrong verification key is provided
+	kBad := Key{Kind: Key25519, Public: []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, Votes: 2}
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), kBad); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature() did not error for wrong verification key")
+	}
+
+	// Test someone can't misuse our public API for verifying node-keys
+	a, _ := Open(newTestchain(t, "G1\nG1.template = genesis",
+		optTemplate("genesis", AUM{MessageKind: AUMCheckpoint, State: &State{
+			Keys:               []Key{k},
+			DisablementSecrets: [][]byte{disablementKDF([]byte{1, 2, 3})},
+		}})).Chonk())
+	if err := a.NodeKeyAuthorized(node.Public(), nestedSig.Serialize()); err == nil {
+		t.Error("NodeKeyAuthorized(SigCredential, node) did not fail")
+	}
+	// but that they can use it properly (nested in a SigRotation)
+	if err := a.NodeKeyAuthorized(node.Public(), sig.Serialize()); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("NodeKeyAuthorized(SigRotation{SigCredential}, node) failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Test verification fails if the inner signature is invalid
+	tmp := make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize)
+	copy(tmp, nestedSig.Signature)
+	copy(nestedSig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad inner signature")
+	}
+	copy(nestedSig.Signature, tmp)
+
+	// Test verification fails if the outer signature is invalid
+	copy(tmp, sig.Signature)
+	copy(sig.Signature, []byte{1, 2, 3, 4})
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with bad outer signature")
+	}
+	copy(sig.Signature, tmp)
+
+	// Test verification fails if we attempt to check a different node-key
+	otherNode := key.NewNode()
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(otherNode.Public(), k); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature(otherNode) succeeded with different principal")
+	}
+
+	// Test verification fails if the outer signature is signed with a
+	// different public key to whats specified in WrappingPubkey
+	sig.Signature = ed25519.Sign(priv, sigHash[:])
+	if err := sig.verifySignature(node.Public(), k); err == nil {
+		t.Error("verifySignature(node) succeeded with different signature")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestSigSerializeUnserialize(t *testing.T) {
 	nodeKeyPub := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}
 	pub, priv := testingKey25519(t, 1)
diff --git a/tka/tka.go b/tka/tka.go
index 17159d2e2..d87a0f50d 100644
--- a/tka/tka.go
+++ b/tka/tka.go
@@ -673,6 +673,10 @@ func (a *Authority) NodeKeyAuthorized(nodeKey key.NodePublic, nodeKeySignature t
 	if err := decoded.Unserialize(nodeKeySignature); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("unserialize: %v", err)
 	}
+	if decoded.SigKind == SigCredential {
+		return errors.New("credential signatures cannot authorize nodes on their own")
+	}
+
 	key, err := a.state.GetKey(decoded.KeyID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("key: %v", err)