diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_de.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_de.ts index 3fb51c10..2ae9ab12 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_de.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_de.ts @@ -3373,9 +3373,8 @@ Anders als der Vorschaukanal, enthält es keine ungetesteten, möglicherweise fe Sie haben einen falschen Boxnamen eingegeben! Es wurde nichts geändert. - Users canceled this operation. - Vorgang durch Benutzer abgebrochen. + Vorgang durch Benutzer abgebrochen. @@ -3390,6 +3389,7 @@ Anders als der Vorschaukanal, enthält es keine ungetesteten, möglicherweise fe + User canceled this operation. @@ -5047,8 +5047,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all change done to it will be reverted next t - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Diese Sandbox ist deaktiviert oder auf andere Gruppen/Benutzer beschränkt. Möchten Sie die Sandbox bearbeiten? @@ -7638,9 +7638,11 @@ an Stelle von "*". - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Sandboxies Ressourcenzugriffsregeln benachteiligen häufiger Programme in der Sandbox. OpenFilePath und OpenKeyPath funktionieren nur für Programme, die sich auf dem Host befinden. Um eine Regel ohne diese Beschränkungen zu definieren, müssen OpenPipePath oder OpenConfPath verwendet werden. Ebenso werden alle Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path Anweisungen, welche durch eine Negation definiert werden, z.B. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’, immer für Programmdateien (Binaries), die sich innerhalb einer Sandbox befinden, geschlossen sein. Beide Beschränkungen lassen sich auf der “Zugriffsrichtlinien”-Seite ausschalten. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxies Ressourcenzugriffsregeln benachteiligen häufiger Programme in der Sandbox. OpenFilePath und OpenKeyPath funktionieren nur für Programme, die sich auf dem Host befinden. Um eine Regel ohne diese Beschränkungen zu definieren, müssen OpenPipePath oder OpenConfPath verwendet werden. Ebenso werden alle Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path Anweisungen, welche durch eine Negation definiert werden, z.B. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’, immer für Programmdateien (Binaries), die sich innerhalb einer Sandbox befinden, geschlossen sein. Beide Beschränkungen lassen sich auf der “Zugriffsrichtlinien”-Seite ausschalten. Dies wird gemacht um bösartige Prozesse in einer Sandbox daran zu hindern, eine umbenannte Kopie von sich selbst zu erstellen, um so auf geschützte Ressourcen zuzugreifen. Ein anderes Einfallstor ist die Injektion einer Programmbibliothek in einen befugten Prozess um Zugang zu allem zu erhalten, auf das dieser Prozess Zugriff hat. Mit der Verwendung des Abbildschutzes (Host Image Protection), kann dies verhindert werden, durch die Blockierung des Ladens von Programmbibliotheken innerhalb der Sandbox in Programme (installiert auf dem Hostrechner) die in einer Sandbox laufen. @@ -8068,8 +8070,9 @@ Der Prozessübereinstimmungslevel hat eine höhere Priorität als die Genauigkei - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Sicherheitsisolation durch die Verwendung eines stark eingeschränkten Prozesstokens ist Sandboxies hauptsächliches Mittel um Sandboxrestriktionen zu erzwingen. Falls dies deaktiviert ist, wird die Box im Applikationsunterteilungsmodus betrieben und bietet somit nicht länger verlässliche Sicherheit, sondern nur einfache Applikationsunterteilung. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Sicherheitsisolation durch die Verwendung eines stark eingeschränkten Prozesstokens ist Sandboxies hauptsächliches Mittel um Sandboxrestriktionen zu erzwingen. Falls dies deaktiviert ist, wird die Box im Applikationsunterteilungsmodus betrieben und bietet somit nicht länger verlässliche Sicherheit, sondern nur einfache Applikationsunterteilung. @@ -8218,8 +8221,9 @@ Bitte beachten Sie, dass diese Werte aktuell nutzerspezifisch sind und global f - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - Wenn <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Boxverschlüsselung</a> eingeschaltet ist, wird der Boxquellenordner, inklusive des Registryhives auf einem verschlüsselten Diskabbild, durch die Verwendung von <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS Implementierung, gespeichert. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + Wenn <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Boxverschlüsselung</a> eingeschaltet ist, wird der Boxquellenordner, inklusive des Registryhives auf einem verschlüsselten Diskabbild, durch die Verwendung von <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS Implementierung, gespeichert. @@ -8464,18 +8468,21 @@ Bitte beachten Sie, dass diese Werte aktuell nutzerspezifisch sind und global f - Hide Firmware Informations - Verstecke Firmwareinformationen + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations + Verstecke Firmwareinformationen - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Einige Programme lesen Systemdetails über WMI (eine in Windows eingebaute Datenbank) aus, anstatt auf normalen Wegen. Zum Beispiel könnte "tasklist.exe" eine vollständige Prozessliste erhalten, selbst wenn "HideOtherBoxes" durch Zugriff auf WMI geöffnet wird. Aktivieren Sie diese Option, um dieses Verhalten zu beenden. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. + Einige Programme lesen Systemdetails über WMI (eine in Windows eingebaute Datenbank) aus, anstatt auf normalen Wegen. Zum Beispiel könnte "tasklist.exe" eine vollständige Prozessliste erhalten, selbst wenn "HideOtherBoxes" durch Zugriff auf WMI geöffnet wird. Aktivieren Sie diese Option, um dieses Verhalten zu beenden. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) - Hindere sandgeboxte Prozesse daran, über WMI auf Systemdetails zuzugreifen (siehe Tooltip für mehr Infos) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Hindere sandgeboxte Prozesse daran, über WMI auf Systemdetails zuzugreifen (siehe Tooltip für mehr Infos) @@ -8494,8 +8501,9 @@ Bitte beachten Sie, dass diese Werte aktuell nutzerspezifisch sind und global f - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom - Speichere die aktuellen Firmwaretabellen in HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Speichere die aktuellen Firmwaretabellen in HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9482,8 +9490,9 @@ Bitte beachten Sie, dass diese Werte aktuell nutzerspezifisch sind und global f - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu - Füge 'Setze Erzwinge in Sandbox' zum Kontextmenü hinzu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Füge 'Setze Erzwinge in Sandbox' zum Kontextmenü hinzu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_en.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_en.ts index 5d477f4e..17afa9a6 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_en.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_en.ts @@ -3872,11 +3872,6 @@ Please check if there is an update for sandboxie. Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -3890,6 +3885,7 @@ Please check if there is an update for sandboxie. + User canceled this operation. @@ -5184,8 +5180,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? @@ -7174,7 +7170,8 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7355,8 +7352,10 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8020,8 +8019,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + @@ -8254,18 +8254,20 @@ Note: Forced Programs and Force Folders settings for a sandbox do not apply to - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8285,7 +8287,8 @@ Note: Forced Programs and Force Folders settings for a sandbox do not apply to - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9394,7 +9397,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_es.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_es.ts index 0fe2a565..76405c37 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_es.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_es.ts @@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ A diferencia del canal previo, no incluye cambios sin probar, potencialmente rom + User canceled this operation. @@ -3775,11 +3776,6 @@ A diferencia del canal previo, no incluye cambios sin probar, potencialmente rom You typed a wrong box name! Nothing was changed. - - - Users canceled this operation. - - USB sandbox not found; creating: %1 @@ -5771,8 +5767,8 @@ NO seleccionará: %2 - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Esta sandbox esta deshabilitada, ¿desea habilitarla? @@ -8224,8 +8220,9 @@ El proceso de nivel de coincidencia tiene mayor prioridad que la especificidad y - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - El aislamiento de seguridad a travez del uso de procesos fuertemente restringidos es el principal significado de Sandboxie de reforzar restricciones, cuando esto esta deshabilitado la caja es operada en modo de compartimiento de aplicación, ej. no provee seguridad confiable, simplemente solo compartimentación de aplicacion. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + El aislamiento de seguridad a travez del uso de procesos fuertemente restringidos es el principal significado de Sandboxie de reforzar restricciones, cuando esto esta deshabilitado la caja es operada en modo de compartimiento de aplicación, ej. no provee seguridad confiable, simplemente solo compartimentación de aplicacion. Disable Security Isolation (experimental) @@ -8440,9 +8437,11 @@ en cambio de "*". - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Las reglas de acceso a recursos de Sandboxie a menudo discriminan contra los binarios de programas ubicados dentro de la sandbox. OpenFilePath y OpenKeyPath funcionan solo para binarios de aplicaciones ubicadas de manera nativa en el ordenador. Para definir una regla sin esta restricción, se debe usar OpenPipePath o OpenConfPath. De igual manera, todas las directivas Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path que se definen por negación, por ejemplo, 'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' siempre estarán cerradas para binarios ubicados dentro de una sandbox. Ambas políticas de restricción pueden ser desactivadas en la página de "Políticas de acceso". + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Las reglas de acceso a recursos de Sandboxie a menudo discriminan contra los binarios de programas ubicados dentro de la sandbox. OpenFilePath y OpenKeyPath funcionan solo para binarios de aplicaciones ubicadas de manera nativa en el ordenador. Para definir una regla sin esta restricción, se debe usar OpenPipePath o OpenConfPath. De igual manera, todas las directivas Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path que se definen por negación, por ejemplo, 'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' siempre estarán cerradas para binarios ubicados dentro de una sandbox. Ambas políticas de restricción pueden ser desactivadas en la página de "Políticas de acceso". Esto se hace para evitar que procesos maliciosos dentro de la sandbox creen una copia renombrada de sí mismos y accedan a recursos protegidos. Otro vector de explotación es la inyección de una biblioteca en un proceso autorizado para obtener acceso a todo lo que se le permite acceder. Utilizando la Protección de Imagen del Host, esto puede prevenirse bloqueando a las aplicaciones (instaladas en el host) que se ejecuten dentro de una sandbox y que carguen bibliotecas desde la propia sandbox. @@ -8776,8 +8775,9 @@ Para especificar un proceso, utiliza '$:program.exe' como ruta. - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - Cuando se activa la <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Encriptación de Caja</a>, la carpeta raíz de la caja, incluido su registro, se almacena en una imagen de disco cifrada, utilizando la implementación AES-XTS de <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor</a>. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + Cuando se activa la <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Encriptación de Caja</a>, la carpeta raíz de la caja, incluido su registro, se almacena en una imagen de disco cifrada, utilizando la implementación AES-XTS de <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor</a>. @@ -9145,7 +9145,8 @@ Para especificar un proceso, utiliza '$:program.exe' como ruta. - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9405,18 +9406,20 @@ Por favor note que estos valores son especificos para usuario y guardados global - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -9929,7 +9932,8 @@ Por favor note que estos valores son especificos para usuario y guardados global - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_fr.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_fr.ts index 0c2b84b0..96012409 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_fr.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_fr.ts @@ -3239,6 +3239,7 @@ Contrairement au canal des Aperçus, cela n'inclut pas les modifications no + User canceled this operation. @@ -3935,9 +3936,8 @@ Ce fichier fait partie de Sandboxie et toute modification faite sur lui sera ann Vous avez saisi un mauvais nom de bac ! Rien n'a été modifié. - Users canceled this operation. - L'utilisateur a annulé cette opération. + L'utilisateur a annulé cette opération. @@ -5867,8 +5867,8 @@ Remarque : La recherche de mise à jour est souvent en retard par rapport à la - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Ce bac est désactivé ou restreint à un groupe/utilisateur ; voulez-vous le modifier ? @@ -8217,8 +8217,9 @@ Si des processus directeurs sont définis, tous les autres sont traités comme d - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - Lorsque le <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">chiffrement de bac</a> est activé, le dossier racine du bac (y compris sa ruche du registre) est stocké dans une image disque chiffrée en utilisant l'implémentation AES-XTS de <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor</a>. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + Lorsque le <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">chiffrement de bac</a> est activé, le dossier racine du bac (y compris sa ruche du registre) est stocké dans une image disque chiffrée en utilisant l'implémentation AES-XTS de <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor</a>. @@ -8732,8 +8733,9 @@ Le niveau de correspondance du processus a une priorité plus élevée que la sp - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - L'isolation de sécurité par l'utilisation d'un jeton de processus fortement restreint est le principal moyen utilisé par Sandboxie pour appliquer les restrictions du bac. Lorsque cette fonction est désactivée, le bac fonctionne en mode conteneur d'applications, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne fournit plus de sécurité fiable, mais seulement une simple compartimentation des applications. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + L'isolation de sécurité par l'utilisation d'un jeton de processus fortement restreint est le principal moyen utilisé par Sandboxie pour appliquer les restrictions du bac. Lorsque cette fonction est désactivée, le bac fonctionne en mode conteneur d'applications, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne fournit plus de sécurité fiable, mais seulement une simple compartimentation des applications. @@ -9383,9 +9385,11 @@ Veuillez noter que ces valeurs sont actuellement spécifiques à l'utilisat - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Les règles d'accès aux ressources de Sandboxie discriminent souvent les binaires des programmes situés dans le bac. OpenFilePath et OpenKeyPath fonctionnent uniquement pour les binaires des applications situées nativement sur l'hôte. Afin de définir une règle sans cette restriction, OpenPipePath et OpenConfPath doivent être utilisés. De même, toutes les directives Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path qui sont définies par une négation (par exemple « ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users* ») seront toujours fermées aux binaires situés dans un bac. Les deux politiques de restriction peuvent être désactivées sur la page « Politiques d'accès ». + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Les règles d'accès aux ressources de Sandboxie discriminent souvent les binaires des programmes situés dans le bac. OpenFilePath et OpenKeyPath fonctionnent uniquement pour les binaires des applications situées nativement sur l'hôte. Afin de définir une règle sans cette restriction, OpenPipePath et OpenConfPath doivent être utilisés. De même, toutes les directives Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path qui sont définies par une négation (par exemple « ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users* ») seront toujours fermées aux binaires situés dans un bac. Les deux politiques de restriction peuvent être désactivées sur la page « Politiques d'accès ». Ceci est fait pour empêcher les processus malveillants à l'intérieur du bac de créer une copie renommée d'eux-mêmes et d'accéder aux ressources protégées. Un autre vecteur d'exploit est l'injection d'une bibliothèque dans un processus autorisé afin d'accéder à tout ce qu'il est autorisé d'accéder. En utilisant la Protection d'Image de l'Hôte, cela peut être empêché en bloquant les applications (installées sur l'hôte) lancées dans un bac de charger des bibliothèques depuis le bac lui-même. @@ -9551,19 +9555,21 @@ Ceci est fait pour empêcher les processus malveillants à l'intérieur du - Hide Firmware Informations - Masquer les informations du microgiciel + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations + Masquer les informations du microgiciel - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. Certains programmes lisent les détails du système en se servant de WMI (une base de données incluse avec Windows) au lieu d'utiliser des méthodes normales. Par exemple, « tasklist.exe » peut ainsi obtenir la liste complète des processus même si « Masquer les propres processus de Sandboxie de la liste des tâches » est activé. Utilisez cette option pour empêcher ce comportement. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) - Empêcher les processus d'un bac d'accéder aux détails du système en se servant de WMI (voir la bulle d'aide pour plus d'information) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Empêcher les processus d'un bac d'accéder aux détails du système en se servant de WMI (voir la bulle d'aide pour plus d'information) @@ -9582,8 +9588,9 @@ Ceci est fait pour empêcher les processus malveillants à l'intérieur du - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom - Copier la table du microgiciel actuel dans « HKCU\System\SbieCustom » + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Copier la table du microgiciel actuel dans « HKCU\System\SbieCustom » @@ -10292,8 +10299,9 @@ Ceci est fait pour empêcher les processus malveillants à l'intérieur du - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu - Ajouter « Toujours forcer dans un bac à sable » au menu contextuel + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Ajouter « Toujours forcer dans un bac à sable » au menu contextuel diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_hu.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_hu.ts index c1f469dd..f0cbd9e5 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_hu.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_hu.ts @@ -3426,6 +3426,7 @@ This box <a href="sbie://docs/privacy-mode">prevents access to a + User canceled this operation. @@ -4030,11 +4031,6 @@ Nem választás: %2 You typed a wrong box name! Nothing was changed. - - - Users canceled this operation. - - No Force Process @@ -5400,8 +5396,8 @@ Ez a fájl a Sandboxie része, és minden rajta végzett módosítás vissza les - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Ez a homokozó le van tiltva. Bekapcsolja? @@ -7366,7 +7362,8 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7782,8 +7779,10 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8345,8 +8344,9 @@ A folyamategyezési szint magasabb prioritású, mint a specifikusság, és leí - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Az erősen korlátozott folyamatjogkivonat használatával történő biztonsági elkülönítés a Sandboxie elsődleges eszköze a sandbox korlátozások érvényesítésére. Ha ez ki van kapcsolva, a homokozó alkalmazásrekesz módban működik, vagyis többé nem nyújt megbízható biztonságot, csak egyszerű alkalmazás-területekre bontás. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Az erősen korlátozott folyamatjogkivonat használatával történő biztonsági elkülönítés a Sandboxie elsődleges eszköze a sandbox korlátozások érvényesítésére. Ha ez ki van kapcsolva, a homokozó alkalmazásrekesz módban működik, vagyis többé nem nyújt megbízható biztonságot, csak egyszerű alkalmazás-területekre bontás. @@ -8684,18 +8684,20 @@ A naplózást az ini használatával testreszabhatja, ha megadja: - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8715,7 +8717,8 @@ A naplózást az ini használatával testreszabhatja, ha megadja: - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9306,7 +9309,8 @@ Felhívjuk figyelmét, hogy ezek az értékek jelenleg felhasználóspecifikusak - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_it.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_it.ts index d99810d3..5b5814cd 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_it.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_it.ts @@ -3743,11 +3743,6 @@ Effettuare la pulizia? Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -3761,6 +3756,7 @@ Effettuare la pulizia? + User canceled this operation. @@ -5456,8 +5452,8 @@ Questo file fa parte di Sandboxie e tutte le modifiche apportate ad esso saranno - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Quest'area virtuale è disattivata, vuoi attivarla? @@ -7419,7 +7415,8 @@ Se si è già un Great Supporter su Patreon, Sandboxie può verificare la presen - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7960,9 +7957,11 @@ Se si è già un Great Supporter su Patreon, Sandboxie può verificare la presen - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Le regole di accesso alle risorse di Sandboxie spesso discriminano i programmi eseguibili all'interno dell'area virtuale. OpenFilePath e OpenKeyPath funzionano solo per gli eseguibili delle applicazioni situati sull'host in modo nativo. Per definire una regola senza questa restrizione, è necessario utilizzare OpenPipePath o OpenConfPath. Allo stesso modo, tutte le regole Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path che sono definite per negazione, ad esempio ‘ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:\Users*’ saranno sempre chiuse per gli eseguibili situati all'interno dell'area virtuale. Entrambi i criteri di restrizione possono essere disattivati dalla pagina “Criteri di accesso”. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Le regole di accesso alle risorse di Sandboxie spesso discriminano i programmi eseguibili all'interno dell'area virtuale. OpenFilePath e OpenKeyPath funzionano solo per gli eseguibili delle applicazioni situati sull'host in modo nativo. Per definire una regola senza questa restrizione, è necessario utilizzare OpenPipePath o OpenConfPath. Allo stesso modo, tutte le regole Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path che sono definite per negazione, ad esempio ‘ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:\Users*’ saranno sempre chiuse per gli eseguibili situati all'interno dell'area virtuale. Entrambi i criteri di restrizione possono essere disattivati dalla pagina “Criteri di accesso”. In questo modo si impedisce che i processi dannosi all'interno dell'area virtuale creino una copia rinominata di se stessi e accedano alle risorse protette. Un altro vettore di exploit è l'iniezione di una libreria DLL in un processo autorizzato per ottenere l'accesso a tutto ciò a cui è consentito accedere. Utilizzando la protezione dell'immagine host, questo può essere evitato impedendo alle applicazioni (installate sull'host) in esecuzione nell'area virtuale di caricare le librerie DLL dalla stessa area virtuale. @@ -8425,8 +8424,9 @@ Il livello di corrispondenza del processo ha una priorità più alta della speci - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - L'isolamento di sicurezza che consiste nell'uso di un token di processo fortemente limitato è il metodo principale di Sandboxie di applicare restrizioni all'area virtuale. Quando questa opzione è disattivata, l'area virtuale viene gestita dalla modalità di compartimento delle applicazioni, in cui viene fornito un semplice compartimento delle applicazioni senza le normali misure di sicurezza. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + L'isolamento di sicurezza che consiste nell'uso di un token di processo fortemente limitato è il metodo principale di Sandboxie di applicare restrizioni all'area virtuale. Quando questa opzione è disattivata, l'area virtuale viene gestita dalla modalità di compartimento delle applicazioni, in cui viene fornito un semplice compartimento delle applicazioni senza le normali misure di sicurezza. Disable Security Isolation (experimental) @@ -8894,18 +8894,20 @@ I seguenti valori sono specifici per l'utente e salvati a livello globale p - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8925,7 +8927,8 @@ I seguenti valori sono specifici per l'utente e salvati a livello globale p - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9970,7 +9973,8 @@ in modo diverso a seconda dell'interfaccia di visualizzazione. - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ja.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ja.ts index 43f1b334..1ff8b7d7 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ja.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ja.ts @@ -3417,11 +3417,6 @@ Do you want to do the clean up? Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -3435,6 +3430,7 @@ Do you want to do the clean up? + User canceled this operation. @@ -5118,8 +5114,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all change done to it will be reverted next t - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? @@ -6702,7 +6698,8 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7142,7 +7139,8 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. @@ -8019,8 +8017,10 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8186,18 +8186,20 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8217,7 +8219,8 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -8820,7 +8823,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ko.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ko.ts index 4fe5e72a..71e9115f 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ko.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ko.ts @@ -4238,9 +4238,8 @@ No will choose: %2 박스 이름을 잘못 입력했습니다! 아무것도 변경되지 않았습니다. - Users canceled this operation. - 사용자가 이 작업을 취소했습니다. + 사용자가 이 작업을 취소했습니다. @@ -4255,6 +4254,7 @@ No will choose: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5633,8 +5633,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? 이 샌드박스는 사용할 수 없거나 그룹/사용자로 제한되어 있습니다. 편집하시겠습니까? @@ -8210,8 +8210,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - 매우 제한된 프로세스 토큰의 사용을 통한 보안 격리는 샌드박스 제한을 시행하는 Sandboxie의 주요 수단이며, 이 기능이 비활성화되면 박스가 응용 프로그램 구획 모드에서 작동됩니다 (즉, 더 이상 신뢰할 수있는 보안을 제공하지 않고 간단한 응용 프로그램 구획화). + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + 매우 제한된 프로세스 토큰의 사용을 통한 보안 격리는 샌드박스 제한을 시행하는 Sandboxie의 주요 수단이며, 이 기능이 비활성화되면 박스가 응용 프로그램 구획 모드에서 작동됩니다 (즉, 더 이상 신뢰할 수있는 보안을 제공하지 않고 간단한 응용 프로그램 구획화). @@ -8442,9 +8443,11 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - 샌드박스의 리소스 액세스 규칙은 샌드박스 내부에 있는 프로그램 이진 파일을 차별하는 경우가 많습니다. OpenFilePath 및 OpenKeyPath는 호스트에 기본적으로 있는 응용 프로그램 이진 파일에만 작동합니다. 이 제한이 없는 규칙을 정의하려면 OpenPipePath 또는 OpenConfPath를 사용해야 합니다. 마찬가지로 모두 닫힘 (파일|키|Ipc)예를 들어 ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*'는 샌드박스 내에 있는 이진 파일의 경우 항상 닫혀 있습니다. 두 제한 정책 모두 "액세스 정책" 페이지에서 사용 불가능으로 설정할 수 있습니다. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + 샌드박스의 리소스 액세스 규칙은 샌드박스 내부에 있는 프로그램 이진 파일을 차별하는 경우가 많습니다. OpenFilePath 및 OpenKeyPath는 호스트에 기본적으로 있는 응용 프로그램 이진 파일에만 작동합니다. 이 제한이 없는 규칙을 정의하려면 OpenPipePath 또는 OpenConfPath를 사용해야 합니다. 마찬가지로 모두 닫힘 (파일|키|Ipc)예를 들어 ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*'는 샌드박스 내에 있는 이진 파일의 경우 항상 닫혀 있습니다. 두 제한 정책 모두 "액세스 정책" 페이지에서 사용 불가능으로 설정할 수 있습니다. 이 작업은 샌드박스 내부의 악성 프로세스가 자신의 이름이 변경된 복사본을 생성하여 보호된 리소스에 액세스하는 것을 방지하기 위해 수행됩니다. 또 다른 공격 벡터는 라이브러리가 액세스할 수 있는 모든 항목에 액세스하기 위해 승인된 프로세스에 라이브러리를 주입하는 것입니다. 호스트 이미지 보호를 사용하면 샌드박스 내부에서 실행 중인 응용 프로그램 (호스트에 설치)이 샌드박스 자체에서 라이브러리를 로드하지 못하도록 차단하여 이러한 문제를 방지할 수 있습니다. @@ -8530,8 +8533,9 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">박스 암호화</a>가 활성화되면 Disk Cryptor의 AES-XTS 구현을 사용하여 레지스트리 하이브를 포함한 박스의 루트 폴더가 암호화된 디스크 이미지에 저장됩니다. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">박스 암호화</a>가 활성화되면 Disk Cryptor의 AES-XTS 구현을 사용하여 레지스트리 하이브를 포함한 박스의 루트 폴더가 암호화된 디스크 이미지에 저장됩니다. @@ -9030,19 +9034,21 @@ instead of "*". - Hide Firmware Informations - 펌웨어 정보 숨기기 + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations + 펌웨어 정보 숨기기 - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. 일부 프로그램은 일반적인 방법 대신 WMI (Windows 기본 제공 데이터베이스)를 통해 시스템 세부 정보를 읽습니다. 예를 들어, WMI에 액세스하여 "HideOtherBoxes"를 열어도 "tasklist.exe"는 전체 프로세스 목록을 가져올 수 있습니다. 이 옵션을 사용하여 더 무거운 것을 중지할 수 있습니다. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) - 샌드박스화된 프로세스가 WMI를 통해 시스템 세부 정보에 액세스하는 것을 방지합니다 (자세한 내용은 도구 설명 참조) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + 샌드박스화된 프로세스가 WMI를 통해 시스템 세부 정보에 액세스하는 것을 방지합니다 (자세한 내용은 도구 설명 참조) @@ -9061,8 +9067,9 @@ instead of "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom - 현재 펌웨어 테이블을 HKCU\System\SbieCustom에 덤프 + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + 현재 펌웨어 테이블을 HKCU\System\SbieCustom에 덤프 @@ -10076,8 +10083,9 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu - 상황에 맞는 메뉴에 '샌드박스에서 강제 설정' 추가 + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + 상황에 맞는 메뉴에 '샌드박스에서 강제 설정' 추가 diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_nl.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_nl.ts index 9fdcade3..77353d8a 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_nl.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_nl.ts @@ -4103,11 +4103,6 @@ Nee zal %2 kiezen Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -4121,6 +4116,7 @@ Nee zal %2 kiezen + User canceled this operation. @@ -5515,8 +5511,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Deze sandbox is uitgeschakeld. Wilt u hem inschakelen? @@ -7619,7 +7615,8 @@ Als leidende processen gedefinieerd zijn, worden alle andere als achterblijvende - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7800,8 +7797,10 @@ Als leidende processen gedefinieerd zijn, worden alle andere als achterblijvende - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8384,8 +8383,9 @@ Het proces-overeenstemmingsniveau heeft een hogere prioriteit dan de specificite - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Beveiligingsisolatie door het gebruik van een zwaar beperkt procestoken is de primaire manier van Sandboxie om sandboxbeperkingen af te dwingen. Wanneer dit uitgeschakeld is, werkt de box in de toepassingscompartimentenmodus, d.w.z. hij biedt niet langer betrouwbare beveiliging, alleen eenvoudige toepassingscompartimentering. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Beveiligingsisolatie door het gebruik van een zwaar beperkt procestoken is de primaire manier van Sandboxie om sandboxbeperkingen af te dwingen. Wanneer dit uitgeschakeld is, werkt de box in de toepassingscompartimentenmodus, d.w.z. hij biedt niet langer betrouwbare beveiliging, alleen eenvoudige toepassingscompartimentering. @@ -8695,18 +8695,20 @@ in plaats van "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8726,7 +8728,8 @@ in plaats van "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9499,7 +9502,8 @@ Merk op dat deze waarden momenteel gebruikersspecifiek zijn en globaal worden op - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pl.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pl.ts index 71e686dc..07f99e5f 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pl.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pl.ts @@ -3930,11 +3930,6 @@ Do you want to do the clean up? Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -3948,6 +3943,7 @@ Do you want to do the clean up? + User canceled this operation. @@ -5730,8 +5726,8 @@ Uwaga: Sprawdzanie aktualizacji często pomija najnowsze wydania GitHub, aby zap - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Ta piaskownica jest wyłączona, czy chcesz ją teraz włączyć? @@ -8055,7 +8051,8 @@ Jeśli zdefiniowane są procesy wiodące, wszystkie inne są traktowane jako pro - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -8409,9 +8406,11 @@ zamiast "*". - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Zasady dostępu do zasobów Sandboxa często dyskryminują binarki programów znajdujących się wewnątrz piaskownicy. OpenFilePath i OpenKeyPath działają tylko dla binarek aplikacji znajdujących się natywnie na hoście. Aby zdefiniować regułę bez tego ograniczenia, należy użyć OpenPipePath lub OpenConfPath. Podobnie, wszystkie dyrektywy Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path, które są zdefiniowane przez negację np. 'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' będą zawsze zamknięte dla binariów znajdujących się wewnątrz sandboxa. Obie polityki ograniczeń mogą być wyłączone na stronie "Zasady dostępu". + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Zasady dostępu do zasobów Sandboxa często dyskryminują binarki programów znajdujących się wewnątrz piaskownicy. OpenFilePath i OpenKeyPath działają tylko dla binarek aplikacji znajdujących się natywnie na hoście. Aby zdefiniować regułę bez tego ograniczenia, należy użyć OpenPipePath lub OpenConfPath. Podobnie, wszystkie dyrektywy Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path, które są zdefiniowane przez negację np. 'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' będą zawsze zamknięte dla binariów znajdujących się wewnątrz sandboxa. Obie polityki ograniczeń mogą być wyłączone na stronie "Zasady dostępu". Ma to zapobiec tworzeniu przez nieuczciwe procesy wewnątrz piaskownicy kopii o zmienionej nazwie i uzyskiwaniu dostępu do chronionych zasobów. Innym wektorem exploitów jest wstrzyknięcie biblioteki do autoryzowanego procesu w celu uzyskania dostępu do wszystkiego, do czego ma dostęp. Dzięki Host Image Protection można temu zapobiec, blokując aplikacjom (zainstalowanym na hoście) działającym wewnątrz piaskownicy możliwość ładowania bibliotek z samej piaskownicy. @@ -8485,8 +8484,9 @@ Ma to zapobiec tworzeniu przez nieuczciwe procesy wewnątrz piaskownicy kopii o - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - Gdy włączone jest <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Szyfrowanie boksu</a>, folder główny boksu, w tym gałąź rejestru, jest przechowywany w zaszyfrowanym obrazie dysku przy użyciu <a href="https:/ /diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> Implementacja AES-XTS. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + Gdy włączone jest <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Szyfrowanie boksu</a>, folder główny boksu, w tym gałąź rejestru, jest przechowywany w zaszyfrowanym obrazie dysku przy użyciu <a href="https:/ /diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> Implementacja AES-XTS. @@ -9002,8 +9002,9 @@ Poziom dopasowania do procesu ma wyższy priorytet niż specyfika i opisuje spos - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Izolacja bezpieczeństwa poprzez użycie silnie ograniczonego tokena procesu jest podstawowym sposobem Sandboxie wymuszania ograniczeń piaskownicy, gdy Izolacja jest wyłączona to boks działa w trybie komory aplikacji, tj. nie zapewnia już niezawodnego bezpieczeństwa, tylko prosty podział aplikacji na komory. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Izolacja bezpieczeństwa poprzez użycie silnie ograniczonego tokena procesu jest podstawowym sposobem Sandboxie wymuszania ograniczeń piaskownicy, gdy Izolacja jest wyłączona to boks działa w trybie komory aplikacji, tj. nie zapewnia już niezawodnego bezpieczeństwa, tylko prosty podział aplikacji na komory. Disable Security Isolation (experimental) @@ -9345,18 +9346,20 @@ Należy pamiętać, że te wartości są obecnie specyficzne dla użytkownika i - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -10495,7 +10498,8 @@ W przeciwieństwie do kanału podglądu nie zawiera niesprawdzonych, potencjalni - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_BR.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_BR.ts index 54d4d3d8..f9961527 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_BR.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_BR.ts @@ -3861,9 +3861,8 @@ Erro: %1 Você digitou um nome de caixa errado! Nada foi alterado. - Users canceled this operation. - Os usuários cancelaram essa operação. + Os usuários cancelaram essa operação. @@ -4306,6 +4305,7 @@ Não vou escolher: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5763,8 +5763,8 @@ Não vou escolher: %2 - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Essa caixa está desativada, deseja ativá-la? @@ -8175,8 +8175,10 @@ Se os processos líderes forem definidos, todos os outros serão tratados como p - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. As regras de acesso a recursos do sandboxie geralmente discriminam os binários do programa localizados dentro do sandbox. OpenFilePath e OpenKeyPath funcionam apenas para binários de aplicativos localizados no host nativamente. Para definir uma regra sem essa restrição, deve-se usar OpenPipePath ou OpenConfPath. Da mesma forma, todas as diretivas Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path que são definidas por negação, por exemplo 'ClosedFilePath =! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ será sempre fechado para binários localizados dentro de uma caixa. Ambas as políticas de restrição podem ser desativadas na página “Políticas de Acesso”. Isso é feito para evitar que processos invasores dentro do sandbox criem uma cópia renomeada de si mesmos e acessem recursos protegidos. Outro vetor de exploração é a injeção de uma biblioteca em um processo autorizado para obter acesso a tudo o que é permitido acessar.Usando a proteção de imagem do host, isso pode ser evitado bloqueando os aplicativos (instalados no host) executados dentro de uma caixa de carregar bibliotecas do próprio sandbox. @@ -8208,7 +8210,8 @@ Isso é feito para evitar que processos invasores dentro do sandbox criem uma c - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. Quando a <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Criptografia da caixa</a> está ativada, a pasta raiz da caixa, incluindo sua seção de registro, é armazenada em uma imagem de disco criptografada, usando <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -8716,8 +8719,9 @@ O nível de correspondência do processo tem uma prioridade maior do que a espec - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Isolamento de segurança através do uso de um token de processo fortemente restrito é o principal meio do Sandboxie impor restrições de caixa de areia, quando está desativado a caixa é operada no modo compartimento de aplicativos, ou seja, não está mais fornecendo segurança confiável, apenas compartimentação simples de aplicativo. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Isolamento de segurança através do uso de um token de processo fortemente restrito é o principal meio do Sandboxie impor restrições de caixa de areia, quando está desativado a caixa é operada no modo compartimento de aplicativos, ou seja, não está mais fornecendo segurança confiável, apenas compartimentação simples de aplicativo. @@ -9093,18 +9097,20 @@ ao invés de "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -9124,7 +9130,8 @@ ao invés de "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9896,7 +9903,8 @@ Por favor, note que esse valores são atualmente para o usuário específico e s - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_PT.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_PT.ts index eef1ec0b..df320f2f 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_PT.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_pt_PT.ts @@ -3830,11 +3830,6 @@ Error: %1 You typed a wrong box name! Nothing was changed. - - - Users canceled this operation. - - <br />you need to be on the Great Patreon level or higher to unlock this feature. @@ -4281,6 +4276,7 @@ Não vou definir: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5736,8 +5732,8 @@ Não vou definir: %2 - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Esta caixa está desativada, deseja ativá-la? @@ -8138,8 +8134,10 @@ Se os processos líderes forem definidos, todos os outros serão tratados como p - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. As regras de acesso a recursos do sandboxie geralmente discriminam os binários do programa localizados dentro do sandbox. OpenFilePath e OpenKeyPath funcionam apenas para binários de aplicativos localizados no host nativamente. Para definir uma regra sem essa restrição, deve-se utilizar OpenPipePath ou OpenConfPath. Da mesma forma, todas as diretivas Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path que são definidas por negação, por exemplo 'ClosedFilePath =! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ será sempre fechado para binários localizados dentro de uma caixa. Ambas as políticas de restrição podem ser desativadas na página “Políticas de Acesso”. Isso é feito para evitar que processos invasores dentro do sandbox criem uma cópia renomeada de si mesmos e acessem recursos protegidos. Outro vetor de exploração é a injeção de uma biblioteca em um processo autorizado para obter acesso a tudo o que é permitido acessar.Usando a proteção de imagem do host, isso pode ser evitado bloqueando os aplicativos (instalados no host) executados dentro de uma caixa de carregar bibliotecas do próprio sandbox. @@ -8171,7 +8169,8 @@ Isso é feito para evitar que processos invasores dentro do sandbox criem uma c - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -8688,8 +8687,9 @@ O nível de correspondência do processo tem uma prioridade maior do que a espec - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Isolamento de segurança através do uso de um token de processo fortemente restrito é o principal meio da Sandboxie de impor restrições de caixa de areia, quando esta é desativada a caixa é operada no modo compartimento de aplicativos, ou seja, não está mais fornecendo segurança confiável, apenas compartimentação simples da aplicação. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Isolamento de segurança através do uso de um token de processo fortemente restrito é o principal meio da Sandboxie de impor restrições de caixa de areia, quando esta é desativada a caixa é operada no modo compartimento de aplicativos, ou seja, não está mais fornecendo segurança confiável, apenas compartimentação simples da aplicação. @@ -9052,18 +9052,20 @@ ao invés de "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -9083,7 +9085,8 @@ ao invés de "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9841,7 +9844,8 @@ Por favor, note que este valores são atualmente para o utilizador específico e - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ru.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ru.ts index 27171ba5..526e2852 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ru.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_ru.ts @@ -3834,11 +3834,6 @@ No will choose: %2 Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -3852,6 +3847,7 @@ No will choose: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5175,8 +5171,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all change done to it will be reverted next t - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Эта песочница отключена, вы хотите ее включить? @@ -7061,8 +7057,9 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - Когда <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">шифрование песочницы</a> включено, ее корневая папка, включая куст реестра, сохраняется в зашифрованном образе диска с использованием <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> реализация AES-XTS. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + Когда <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">шифрование песочницы</a> включено, ее корневая папка, включая куст реестра, сохраняется в зашифрованном образе диска с использованием <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> реализация AES-XTS. @@ -7313,9 +7310,11 @@ If you are a Great Supporter on Patreon already, Sandboxie can check online for - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Правила доступа к ресурсам Sandboxie часто дискриминируют двоичные файлы программ, расположенные внутри песочницы. OpenFilePath и OpenKeyPath работают только для двоичных файлов приложений, изначально расположенных на хосте. Чтобы определить правило без этого ограничения, необходимо использовать OpenPipePath или OpenConfPath. Аналогично, все директивы Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path, которые определены отрицанием, например. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ всегда будет закрыт для двоичных файлов, находящихся внутри песочницы. Обе политики ограничения можно отключить на странице "Политики доступа". + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Правила доступа к ресурсам Sandboxie часто дискриминируют двоичные файлы программ, расположенные внутри песочницы. OpenFilePath и OpenKeyPath работают только для двоичных файлов приложений, изначально расположенных на хосте. Чтобы определить правило без этого ограничения, необходимо использовать OpenPipePath или OpenConfPath. Аналогично, все директивы Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path, которые определены отрицанием, например. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ всегда будет закрыт для двоичных файлов, находящихся внутри песочницы. Обе политики ограничения можно отключить на странице "Политики доступа". Это делается для того, чтобы мошеннические процессы внутри песочницы не создавали переименованные копии самих себя и не получали доступ к защищенным ресурсам. Другой вектор эксплойта — внедрение библиотеки в авторизованный процесс, чтобы получить доступ ко всему, к чему ему разрешен доступ. С помощью Host Image Protection это можно предотвратить, заблокировав приложения (установленные на хосте), работающие внутри песочницы, от загрузки библиотек из самой песочницы. @@ -7945,8 +7944,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Изоляция безопасности за счет использования сильно ограниченного токена процесса - это основное средство Sandboxie для принудительного применения ограничений песочницы, когда она отключена, песочница работает в режиме контейнера для приложения, то есть она больше не обеспечивает надежную безопасность, а только простое разделение приложений. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Изоляция безопасности за счет использования сильно ограниченного токена процесса - это основное средство Sandboxie для принудительного применения ограничений песочницы, когда она отключена, песочница работает в режиме контейнера для приложения, то есть она больше не обеспечивает надежную безопасность, а только простое разделение приложений. @@ -8445,18 +8445,20 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8476,7 +8478,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9404,7 +9407,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_sv_SE.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_sv_SE.ts index 2e3c642e..a99ebefc 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_sv_SE.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_sv_SE.ts @@ -4265,11 +4265,6 @@ Nej väljer: %2 Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -4283,6 +4278,7 @@ Nej väljer: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5777,8 +5773,8 @@ Notera: Uppdateringskollen är ofta bakom senaste GitHub-utgivningen för att s - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Denna sandlåda är inaktiverad, vill du aktivera den? @@ -7508,8 +7504,9 @@ Om du redan är en Great Supporter on Patreon, kan Sandboxie söka på nätet f - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - När <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">lådkryptering</a> är aktiverat är lådans root-mapp, inklusive dess registerdatafil, lagrad i en krypterad diskavbild, användandes <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementering. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + När <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">lådkryptering</a> är aktiverat är lådans root-mapp, inklusive dess registerdatafil, lagrad i en krypterad diskavbild, användandes <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementering. @@ -8306,9 +8303,11 @@ Om ledarprocesser är definierade, behandlas alla andra som kvardröjande progra - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Sandboxie:s resurstillgångsregler särskiljer ofta emot programbinärer lokaliserade inuti sandlådan. OpenFilePath och OpenKeyPath fungerar bara för app-binärer lokaliserade på värden ursprungligen. För att kunna definiera en regel utan denna begränsning, måste OpenPipePath eller OpenConPath användas. Likaså, alla stängda(File|Key|Ipc)sökvägsdirektiv vilka är definierade via negation e.x. ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,CUsers* kommer alltid vara stängda för binärer lokaliserade inuti en sandlåda. Båda begränsningspolicyerna kan inaktiveras på sidan Tillgångspolicy. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie:s resurstillgångsregler särskiljer ofta emot programbinärer lokaliserade inuti sandlådan. OpenFilePath och OpenKeyPath fungerar bara för app-binärer lokaliserade på värden ursprungligen. För att kunna definiera en regel utan denna begränsning, måste OpenPipePath eller OpenConPath användas. Likaså, alla stängda(File|Key|Ipc)sökvägsdirektiv vilka är definierade via negation e.x. ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,CUsers* kommer alltid vara stängda för binärer lokaliserade inuti en sandlåda. Båda begränsningspolicyerna kan inaktiveras på sidan Tillgångspolicy. Detta görs för att förhindra Rogue-processer inuti sandlådan från att skapa en namnändrad kopia av sig själva och tillgå skyddade resurser. En annan exploateringsvektor är injicerandet av ett bibliotek in i en auktoriserad process för att få tillgång till allting det ges tillgång till. Användande av Host Image Protection, kan detta förhindras genom att blockera applikationer (installerade på värden) körandes inuti en sandlåda från att ladda bibliotek från sandlådan självt. @@ -8800,8 +8799,9 @@ Processmatchningsnivån har en högre prioritet än säregenheten och beskriver - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Säkerhetsisolering genom användande av tungt begränsade processtecken är Sandboxies primära medel för att tvinga sandlådebegränsningar, när det är inaktiverat opereras lådan i applikationavdelningsläget, d.v.s den tillhandahåller inte längre tillförlitlig säkerhet, bara enkel uppdelning. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Säkerhetsisolering genom användande av tungt begränsade processtecken är Sandboxies primära medel för att tvinga sandlådebegränsningar, när det är inaktiverat opereras lådan i applikationavdelningsläget, d.v.s den tillhandahåller inte längre tillförlitlig säkerhet, bara enkel uppdelning. @@ -8954,18 +8954,20 @@ Processmatchningsnivån har en högre prioritet än säregenheten och beskriver - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8990,7 +8992,8 @@ Processmatchningsnivån har en högre prioritet än säregenheten och beskriver - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -10358,7 +10361,8 @@ istället för "*". - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_tr.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_tr.ts index 6be97e5b..36bea4b3 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_tr.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_tr.ts @@ -3319,6 +3319,7 @@ Unlike the preview channel, it does not include untested, potentially breaking, + User canceled this operation. Kullanıcı bu işlemi iptal etti. @@ -3333,11 +3334,6 @@ Unlike the preview channel, it does not include untested, potentially breaking, You typed a wrong box name! Nothing was changed. Yanlış alan adı yazdınız! Hiçbir şey eklenmedi. - - - Users canceled this operation. - - USB sandbox not found; creating: %1 @@ -4801,8 +4797,8 @@ Lütfen Sandboxie için bir güncelleme olup olmadığını kontrol edin. - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Bu alan devre dışı veya bir grup/kullanıcı ile sınırlandırılmış, etkinleştirmek istiyor musunuz? @@ -7354,8 +7350,9 @@ Not: Bir korumalı alana ilişkin Zorunlu Programlar ve Zorunlu Klasörler ayarl - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Alan Şifreleme</a> etkinleştirildiğinde, kayıt defteri kovanı da dahil olmak üzere alanın kök klasörü, <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor'un</a> AES-XTS uygulaması kullanılarak şifrelenmiş bir disk görüntüsünde depolanır. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Alan Şifreleme</a> etkinleştirildiğinde, kayıt defteri kovanı da dahil olmak üzere alanın kök klasörü, <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor'un</a> AES-XTS uygulaması kullanılarak şifrelenmiş bir disk görüntüsünde depolanır. @@ -7571,9 +7568,11 @@ Not: Bir korumalı alana ilişkin Zorunlu Programlar ve Zorunlu Klasörler ayarl - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Sandboxie'nin kaynak erişim kuralları, genellikle korumalı alan içinde bulunan program ikili dosyalarına göre ayrım yapar. OpenFilePath ve OpenKeyPath yalnızca ana sistemde yerel olarak bulunan uygulama ikili dosyaları için çalışır. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie'nin kaynak erişim kuralları, genellikle korumalı alan içinde bulunan program ikili dosyalarına göre ayrım yapar. OpenFilePath ve OpenKeyPath yalnızca ana sistemde yerel olarak bulunan uygulama ikili dosyaları için çalışır. Bu kısıtlama olmaksızın bir kural tanımlamak için OpenPipePath veya OpenConfPath kullanılmalıdır. Aynı şekilde, olumsuzlama ile tanımlanan tüm Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path yönergeleri, örn. 'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*', korumalı alan içinde bulunan ikili dosyalar için her zaman kapalı olacaktır. Her iki kısıtlama ilkesi de "Erişim İlkeleri" sayfasından devre dışı bırakılabilir. Bu, korumalı alan içindeki haydut işlemlerin kendilerinin yeniden adlandırılmış bir kopyasını oluşturmasını ve korunan kaynaklara erişmesini önlemek için yapılır. Başka bir istismar vektörü de bir kütüphanenin yetkili bir işleme yerleşerek ona izin verilen her şeye erişim hakkı elde etmesidir. Ana Sistem Görüntü Koruması kullanılarak, bir korumalı alanda çalışan uygulamaların (ana sistemde yüklü) korumalı alanda bulunan kütüphaneleri yüklemesi engellenerek bu durum önlenebilir. @@ -8027,18 +8026,21 @@ Bir işlemi belirtmek için yol olarak '$:program.exe' kullanın. - Hide Firmware Informations - Ürün Yazılımı Bilgilerini Gizle + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations + Ürün Yazılımı Bilgilerini Gizle - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Bazı programlar, geleneksel yöntemleri kullanmak yerine, yerleşik bir Windows veritabanı olan WMI (Windows Yönetim Araçları) aracılığıyla sistem ayrıntılarını alır. Örneğin, &apos;tasklist.exe&apos;, &apos;HideOtherBoxes&apos; etkin olsa bile işlemlerin tam listesine erişebilir. Bu tür davranışları önlemek için bu seçeneği etkinleştirin. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. + Bazı programlar, geleneksel yöntemleri kullanmak yerine, yerleşik bir Windows veritabanı olan WMI (Windows Yönetim Araçları) aracılığıyla sistem ayrıntılarını alır. Örneğin, &apos;tasklist.exe&apos;, &apos;HideOtherBoxes&apos; etkin olsa bile işlemlerin tam listesine erişebilir. Bu tür davranışları önlemek için bu seçeneği etkinleştirin. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) - Korumalı alandaki işlemlerin WMI aracılığıyla sistem ayrıntılarına erişmesini önle (daha fazla bilgi için ipucuna bakın) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Korumalı alandaki işlemlerin WMI aracılığıyla sistem ayrıntılarına erişmesini önle (daha fazla bilgi için ipucuna bakın) @@ -8057,8 +8059,9 @@ Bir işlemi belirtmek için yol olarak '$:program.exe' kullanın. - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom - Mevcut Ürün Yazılımı Tablolarını HKCU\System\SbieCustom anahtarına döker + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Mevcut Ürün Yazılımı Tablolarını HKCU\System\SbieCustom anahtarına döker @@ -8410,8 +8413,9 @@ Lütfen bu değerlerin kullanıcıya özel olduğunu ve tüm alanlar için globa - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Güvenlik Yalıtımı, Sandboxie'nin çok kısıtlı işlem belirteci kullanımı yoluyla korumalı alan kısıtlamalarını uygulamasının birincil yoludur. Bu devre dışı bırakılırsa, alan, uygulama bölmesi modunda çalıştırılır, yani artık sağlıklı bir güvenlik sağlayamaz ve yalnızca basit uygulama bölümlemesi sağlar. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Güvenlik Yalıtımı, Sandboxie'nin çok kısıtlı işlem belirteci kullanımı yoluyla korumalı alan kısıtlamalarını uygulamasının birincil yoludur. Bu devre dışı bırakılırsa, alan, uygulama bölmesi modunda çalıştırılır, yani artık sağlıklı bir güvenlik sağlayamaz ve yalnızca basit uygulama bölümlemesi sağlar. @@ -9419,8 +9423,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu - Bağlam menüsüne ‘Korumalı Alanda Zorlamaya Ayarla' seçeneği ekle + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Bağlam menüsüne ‘Korumalı Alanda Zorlamaya Ayarla' seçeneği ekle diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_uk.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_uk.ts index 512bd9db..e4c9ec04 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_uk.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_uk.ts @@ -4099,11 +4099,6 @@ Note: The update check is often behind the latest GitHub release to ensure that Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -4117,6 +4112,7 @@ Note: The update check is often behind the latest GitHub release to ensure that + User canceled this operation. @@ -5479,8 +5475,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Ця пісочниця вимкнена, ви хочете її увімкнути? @@ -7588,7 +7584,8 @@ If leader processes are defined, all others are treated as lingering processes.< - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7769,8 +7766,10 @@ If leader processes are defined, all others are treated as lingering processes.< - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8361,8 +8360,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Ізоляція безпеки використовує дуже обмежений системний токен, програма Sandboxie використовує це для обмежень пісочниці, коли вона використовує режим для додатків, тобто має лише розділення додатків. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Ізоляція безпеки використовує дуже обмежений системний токен, програма Sandboxie використовує це для обмежень пісочниці, коли вона використовує режим для додатків, тобто має лише розділення додатків. @@ -8672,18 +8672,20 @@ instead of "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8703,7 +8705,8 @@ instead of "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9463,7 +9466,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_vi.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_vi.ts index bf96ceeb..2d9fcdb1 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_vi.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_vi.ts @@ -4061,11 +4061,6 @@ Please check if there is an update for sandboxie. Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -4079,6 +4074,7 @@ Please check if there is an update for sandboxie. + User canceled this operation. @@ -5389,8 +5385,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? Sandbox này bị vô hiệu hóa, bạn có muốn bật nó không? @@ -7522,7 +7518,8 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. @@ -7714,8 +7711,10 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. @@ -8216,8 +8215,9 @@ Mức độ đối sánh tiến trình có mức độ ưu tiên cao hơn mức - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - Cách ly bảo mật thông qua việc sử dụng mã thông báo quy trình bị hạn chế nhiều là phương tiện chính của Sandboxie để thực thi các hạn chế Sandbox, khi điều này bị vô hiệu hóa, Sandbox sẽ được vận hành ở chế độ ngăn ứng dụng, tức là nó không còn cung cấp bảo mật đáng tin cậy nữa, chỉ phân chia ứng dụng đơn giản. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Cách ly bảo mật thông qua việc sử dụng mã thông báo quy trình bị hạn chế nhiều là phương tiện chính của Sandboxie để thực thi các hạn chế Sandbox, khi điều này bị vô hiệu hóa, Sandbox sẽ được vận hành ở chế độ ngăn ứng dụng, tức là nó không còn cung cấp bảo mật đáng tin cậy nữa, chỉ phân chia ứng dụng đơn giản. @@ -8570,18 +8570,20 @@ thay vì "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8601,7 +8603,8 @@ thay vì "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9314,7 +9317,8 @@ Xin lưu ý rằng các giá trị này hiện là dành riêng cho người dù - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_CN.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_CN.ts index 040d7549..4fda90be 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_CN.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_CN.ts @@ -4371,9 +4371,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next 您输入了错误的沙盒名！未更改任何设置。 - Users canceled this operation. - 用户取消了本次操作。 + 用户取消了本次操作。 @@ -4388,6 +4387,7 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next + User canceled this operation. @@ -5563,8 +5563,8 @@ Error: %1 - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? 此沙盒已禁用或仅限于特定组/用户，确定要编辑它吗？ @@ -8082,9 +8082,11 @@ Note: Forced Programs and Force Folders settings for a sandbox do not apply to - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Sandboxie 的资源访问规则通常对位于沙盒内的二进制程序具有歧视性 + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie 的资源访问规则通常对位于沙盒内的二进制程序具有歧视性 一般情况下，OpenFilePath 和 OpenKeyPath 只对宿主机上的原生程序（安装在宿主上的）有效 为了定义没有此类限制的规则，则必须使用 OpenPipePath 和 OpenConfPath @@ -8435,8 +8437,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - 通过严格限制进程令牌的使用来进行安全隔离是 Sandboxie 执行沙盒化限制的主要手段，当它被禁用时，沙盒将在应用隔间模式下运行，此时将不再提供可靠的安全限制，只是简单进行应用分隔 + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + 通过严格限制进程令牌的使用来进行安全隔离是 Sandboxie 执行沙盒化限制的主要手段，当它被禁用时，沙盒将在应用隔间模式下运行，此时将不再提供可靠的安全限制，只是简单进行应用分隔 @@ -8717,8 +8720,9 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - 当 <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">沙盒加密</a> 为沙盒根目录启用时，包括虚拟注册表在内，沙盒内容将会被存储在加密的磁盘映像中， 使用 <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS 实现。 + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + 当 <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">沙盒加密</a> 为沙盒根目录启用时，包括虚拟注册表在内，沙盒内容将会被存储在加密的磁盘映像中， 使用 <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS 实现。 @@ -9071,19 +9075,21 @@ Sandboxie 提供了针对这些情况的处理选项，可以在此页面进行 - Hide Firmware Informations - 隐藏固件信息 + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations + 隐藏固件信息 - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. 一些程序通过WMI（Windows内置数据库）而不是常规方式读取系统细节信息。例如，即使通过访问WMI打开“HideOtherBoxs”，“tasklist.exe”也可以获得完整的进程列表。启用此选项可阻止这些行为。 - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) - 防止沙盒进程通过WMI访问系统细节信息（有关更多信息，请参阅工具提示） + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + 防止沙盒进程通过WMI访问系统细节信息（有关更多信息，请参阅工具提示） @@ -9102,8 +9108,9 @@ Sandboxie 提供了针对这些情况的处理选项，可以在此页面进行 - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom - 将当前固件表转储到HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + 将当前固件表转储到HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -10173,7 +10180,8 @@ Sandboxie 提供了针对这些情况的处理选项，可以在此页面进行 - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu diff --git a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_TW.ts b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_TW.ts index 881c45cf..bdfd5691 100644 --- a/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_TW.ts +++ b/SandboxiePlus/SandMan/sandman_zh_TW.ts @@ -4205,11 +4205,6 @@ No will choose: %2 Sandboxie-Plus Warning - - - Users canceled this operation. - - The value is not an existing directory or executable. @@ -4223,6 +4218,7 @@ No will choose: %2 + User canceled this operation. @@ -5533,8 +5529,8 @@ This file is part of Sandboxie and all changed done to it will be reverted next - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? - This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to edit it? + This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone? + This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ? 此沙箱已停用或被限制到特定群組/使用者，是否編輯？ @@ -7533,8 +7529,9 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. - 啟用 <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">沙箱加密</a> 後，沙箱的根目錄 (包括其登錄組態) 將使用 <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor 的</a> AES-XTS 實作方案。 + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + When <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">Box Encryption</a> is enabled the box’s root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor's</a> AES-XTS implementation. + 啟用 <a href="sbie://docs/boxencryption">沙箱加密</a> 後，沙箱的根目錄 (包括其登錄組態) 將使用 <a href="https://diskcryptor.org">Disk Cryptor 的</a> AES-XTS 實作方案。 @@ -7846,9 +7843,11 @@ If you are a great patreaon supporter already, sandboxie can check online for an - Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. + Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the "Access policies" page. This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. - Sandboxie 的資源存取規則通常對位於沙箱內的二進位程式具有歧視性。OpenFilePath 和 OpenKeyPath 只對主機上的原生程式 (安裝在主機上的) 有效。為了定義沒有此類限制的規則，則必須使用 OpenPipePath 和 OpenConfPath。同樣的，透過否定來定義所有的 Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path 指令例如：'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' 將限制沙箱內的程式存取相應資源。這兩種限制原則都可以透過「存取原則」頁面來停用。 + Sandboxie’s resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ‘ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*’ will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. +This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself. + Sandboxie 的資源存取規則通常對位於沙箱內的二進位程式具有歧視性。OpenFilePath 和 OpenKeyPath 只對主機上的原生程式 (安裝在主機上的) 有效。為了定義沒有此類限制的規則，則必須使用 OpenPipePath 和 OpenConfPath。同樣的，透過否定來定義所有的 Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path 指令例如：'ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users*' 將限制沙箱內的程式存取相應資源。這兩種限制原則都可以透過「存取原則」頁面來停用。 這樣做是為了防止沙箱內的流氓處理程序建立自己的重新命名複本並存取受保護的資源。另一個漏洞載體是將一個動態連結程式庫注入到一個被授權處理程序中，以取得對被授權處理程序所允許存取的一切資源的存取權。使用主機映像保護，可以透過阻止在沙箱內執行的應用程式 (安裝在主機上的) 載入來自沙箱的動態連結程式庫來防止此類現象。 @@ -8498,8 +8497,9 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes - Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. - 透過嚴格限制處理程序權杖的使用來進行安全性隔離是 Sandboxie 執行沙箱化限制的主要手段，當它被停用時，沙箱將在應用程式區間模式下執行，此時將不再提供可靠的安全性限制，只是簡單進行應用程式隔離。 + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it’s no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization. + 透過嚴格限制處理程序權杖的使用來進行安全性隔離是 Sandboxie 執行沙箱化限制的主要手段，當它被停用時，沙箱將在應用程式區間模式下執行，此時將不再提供可靠的安全性限制，只是簡單進行應用程式隔離。 @@ -8863,18 +8863,20 @@ instead of "*". - Hide Firmware Informations + Hide Firmware Information + Hide Firmware Informations - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these heavior. + Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, "tasklist.exe" could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if "HideOtherBoxes" is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour. + Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,"tasklist.exe" could get full processes list even if "HideOtherBoxes" is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour. - Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info) + Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info) @@ -8894,7 +8896,8 @@ instead of "*". - Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom + Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom @@ -9500,7 +9503,8 @@ Please note that this values are currently user specific and saved globally for - Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu + Add ‘Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu