Merge pull request #4119 from APMichael/patch-1

Fixed a few typos
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DavidXanatos 2024-07-26 18:47:52 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 03951c62d3
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4 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions

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@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
<item row="6" column="2" colspan="4"> <item row="6" column="2" colspan="4">
<widget class="QLabel" name="lblCrypto"> <widget class="QLabel" name="lblCrypto">
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>When &lt;a href=&quot;sbie://docs/boxencryption&quot;&gt;Box Encryption&lt;/a&gt; is enabled the boxs root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using &lt;a href=&quot;https://diskcryptor.org&quot;&gt;Disk Cryptor's&lt;/a&gt; AES-XTS implementation.</string> <string>When &lt;a href=&quot;sbie://docs/boxencryption&quot;&gt;Box Encryption&lt;/a&gt; is enabled the box's root folder, including its registry hive, is stored in an encrypted disk image, using &lt;a href=&quot;https://diskcryptor.org&quot;&gt;Disk Cryptor's&lt;/a&gt; AES-XTS implementation.</string>
</property> </property>
<property name="wordWrap"> <property name="wordWrap">
<bool>true</bool> <bool>true</bool>
@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@
<item row="3" column="2"> <item row="3" column="2">
<widget class="QLabel" name="label_60"> <widget class="QLabel" name="label_60">
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. its no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization.</string> <string>Security Isolation through the usage of a heavily restricted process token is Sandboxie's primary means of enforcing sandbox restrictions, when this is disabled the box is operated in the application compartment mode, i.e. it's no longer providing reliable security, just simple application compartmentalization.</string>
</property> </property>
<property name="wordWrap"> <property name="wordWrap">
<bool>true</bool> <bool>true</bool>
@ -4293,7 +4293,7 @@ The process match level has a higher priority than the specificity and describes
<item row="4" column="1" colspan="2"> <item row="4" column="1" colspan="2">
<widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkHostProtect"> <widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkHostProtect">
<property name="toolTip"> <property name="toolTip">
<string>Sandboxies resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. ClosedFilePath=! iexplore.exe,C:Users* will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the “Access policies” page. <string>Sandboxie's resource access rules often discriminate against program binaries located inside the sandbox. OpenFilePath and OpenKeyPath work only for application binaries located on the host natively. In order to define a rule without this restriction, OpenPipePath or OpenConfPath must be used. Likewise, all Closed(File|Key|Ipc)Path directives which are defined by negation e.g. 'ClosedFilePath=!iexplore.exe,C:Users*' will be always closed for binaries located inside a sandbox. Both restriction policies can be disabled on the &quot;Access policies&quot; page.
This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself.</string> This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renamed copy of themselves and accessing protected resources. Another exploit vector is the injection of a library into an authorized process to get access to everything it is allowed to access. Using Host Image Protection, this can be prevented by blocking applications (installed on the host) running inside a sandbox from loading libraries from the sandbox itself.</string>
</property> </property>
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
@ -4766,7 +4766,7 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam
<string/> <string/>
</property> </property>
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>Hide Firmware Informations</string> <string>Hide Firmware Information</string>
</property> </property>
</widget> </widget>
</item> </item>
@ -4796,10 +4796,10 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam
<item row="12" column="0" colspan="5"> <item row="12" column="0" colspan="5">
<widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkBlockWMI"> <widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkBlockWMI">
<property name="toolTip"> <property name="toolTip">
<string>Some programs read system deatils through WMI(A Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example,&quot;tasklist.exe&quot; could get full processes list even if &quot;HideOtherBoxes&quot; is opened through accessing WMI. Enable this option to stop these behaviour.</string> <string>Some programs read system details through WMI (a Windows built-in database) instead of normal ways. For example, &quot;tasklist.exe&quot; could get full processes list through accessing WMI, even if &quot;HideOtherBoxes&quot; is used. Enable this option to stop this behaviour.</string>
</property> </property>
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system deatils through WMI (see tooltip for more Info)</string> <string>Prevent sandboxed processes from accessing system details through WMI (see tooltip for more info)</string>
</property> </property>
</widget> </widget>
</item> </item>
@ -4909,7 +4909,7 @@ This is done to prevent rogue processes inside the sandbox from creating a renam
<item row="1" column="4"> <item row="1" column="4">
<widget class="QToolButton" name="btnDumpFW"> <widget class="QToolButton" name="btnDumpFW">
<property name="toolTip"> <property name="toolTip">
<string>Dump the current Firmare Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom</string> <string>Dump the current Firmware Tables to HKCU\System\SbieCustom</string>
</property> </property>
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>Dump FW Tables</string> <string>Dump FW Tables</string>

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@ -640,7 +640,7 @@
<item row="7" column="2" colspan="2"> <item row="7" column="2" colspan="2">
<widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkShellMenu3"> <widget class="QCheckBox" name="chkShellMenu3">
<property name="text"> <property name="text">
<string>Add Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu</string> <string>Add 'Set Force in Sandbox' to the context menu</string>
</property> </property>
</widget> </widget>
</item> </item>

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@ -1680,7 +1680,7 @@ void CSandMan::OnMessage(const QString& MsgData)
} }
} }
else { else {
QMessageBox::warning(g_GUIParent, tr("Sandboxie-Plus Warning"), tr("Users canceled this operation."), QMessageBox::Yes, 0); QMessageBox::warning(g_GUIParent, tr("Sandboxie-Plus Warning"), tr("User canceled this operation."), QMessageBox::Yes, 0);
} }
} }
else if (Message.left(4) == "Run:") else if (Message.left(4) == "Run:")

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@ -1786,7 +1786,7 @@ void CSbieView::OnDoubleClicked(const CSandBoxPtr &pBox)
if (!pBox->IsEnabled()) if (!pBox->IsEnabled())
{ {
if (QMessageBox("Sandboxie-Plus", tr("This sandbox is disabled or restricted to a group/user, do you want to allow box for everybody ?"), QMessageBox::Question, QMessageBox::Yes, QMessageBox::No | QMessageBox::Default | QMessageBox::Escape, QMessageBox::NoButton, this).exec() != QMessageBox::Yes) if (QMessageBox("Sandboxie-Plus", tr("This sandbox is currently disabled or restricted to specific groups or users. Would you like to allow access for everyone?"), QMessageBox::Question, QMessageBox::Yes, QMessageBox::No | QMessageBox::Default | QMessageBox::Escape, QMessageBox::NoButton, this).exec() != QMessageBox::Yes)
pBox->SetText("Enabled", "y");// Fix #3999 pBox->SetText("Enabled", "y");// Fix #3999
} }