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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
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@ -10,76 +10,100 @@ Please report any found security vulnerability directly to me at xanatosdavid[at
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-23 (thanks Diversenok)
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A sandboxed process with administrative privileges could enable SeManageVolumePrivilege,
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this allowed it to read MFT data, in case of files smaller then 1 cluster that allowed to read the file payload
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fixed in: 1.12.3 / 5.67.3
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-22
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NtCreateSectionEx was not filtered by the driver
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fixed in: 1.8.0 / 5.63.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-21
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AlpcConnectPortEx was not filtered by the driver
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fixed in: 1.5.1 / 5.60.1
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-20
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Sandboxed programs could read the memory of host processes,
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presumably this was an intentional design decision by the old devs, but its not required and its better fpr privacy to not allow this.
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Note: You can use ReadIpcPath=$:program.exe to allow read access to unsandboxed processes or processes in other boxes
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fixed in: 1.0.16 / 5.55.16
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-19 [#1714](https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/issues/1714)
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NtGetNextThread was not properly filtered by the sbie driver, hence a sandboxed process could obtain a handle on an unsandboxed thread with write privileges
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The issue can be remedied on older sbie versions by enabling EnableObjectFiltering=y
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fixed in: [1.0.14 / 5.55.14
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-18 (thanks Diversenok)
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NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject was not filtered
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fixed in: 1.0.15 / 5.55.15
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-17 (thanks Diversenok)
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Hard link creation was not properly filtered
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fixed in: 1.0.13 / 5.55.13
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-16
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when starting *COMSRV* unboxed, the returned process handle had full access
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fixed in: 1.0.9 / 5.55.9
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-15 (thanks hg421)
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the HostInjectDll mechanism allowed for local privilege escalation
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fixed in: 0.7.2 / 5.49.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-14 (thanks hg421) [#552](https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/issues/552)
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"\Device\DeviceApi\CMApi" is now filtered by the driver
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this allowed elevated processes to change hardware configuration
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fixed in: 0.7.0 / 5.48.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-13 (thanks hg421) [#553](https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/issues/553)
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"\RPC Control\samss lpc" is now filtered by the driver
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this allowed elevated processes to change passwords, delete users and alike
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fixed in: 0.7.0 / 5.48.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-12 (thanks typpos) [#549](https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/pull/549)
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a race condition in the driver allowed to obtain an elevated rights handle to a unsandboxed process
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fixed in: 0.7.0 / 5.48.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-11 (thanks hg421)
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elevated sandboxed processes could access volumes/disks for reading
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fixed in: 0.7.0 / 5.48.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-10
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the registry isolation could be bypassed, present since Windows 10 Creators Update
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fixed in: 0.5.4d / 5.46.3
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-9
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a Sandboxed process could start sandboxed as system even with DropAdminRights in place
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fixed in: 0.5.4b / 5.46.1
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-8 (thanks Diversenok)
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CVE-2019-13502 "\RPC Control\LSARPC_ENDPOINT" is now filtered by the driver,
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this allowed some system options to be changed.
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fixed in: 0.5.4 / 5.46.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-7
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bug in the dynamic IPC port handling allowed to bypass IPC isolation
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fixed in: 0.5.4 / 5.46.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-6 (thanks Diversenok)
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processes could spawn processes outside the sandbox
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fixed in: 0.5.4 / 5.46.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-5
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added print spooler filter to prevent printers from being set up outside the sandbox
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fixed in: 0.5.4 / 5.46.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-4 (thanks Diversenok)
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Sandboxie now strips particularly problematic privileges from sandboxed system tokens
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with those a process could attempt to bypass the sandbox isolation
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fixed in: 0.5.4 / 5.46.0
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-3 (thanks Diversenok)
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fixed missing SCM access check for sandboxed services
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fixed in: 0.3 / 5.42
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-2
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fixed permission issues with sandboxed system processes
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fixed in: 0.3 / 5.42
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### SECURITY ISSUE ID-1 (thanks Diversenok)
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sandboxed processes could obtain a write handle on non sandboxed processes
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fixed in: 0.2 / 5.41.0
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