clean up remnents of old fingerprint algo (#22645)

This commit is contained in:
Ryan Castellucci 2024-12-14 14:35:14 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 67ae7c2fe1
commit 8d1b4094db
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
2 changed files with 22 additions and 40 deletions

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@ -767,59 +767,47 @@ extern "C" {
xc->done_cert = true; // first cert already processed xc->done_cert = true; // first cert already processed
} }
// **** Start patch Castellucci // Add a data element with a u32be length prefix to the sha1 state.
/* static void sha1_update_len(br_sha1_context *shactx, const void *msg, uint32_t len) {
static void pubkeyfingerprint_pubkey_fingerprint(br_sha1_context *shactx, br_rsa_public_key rsakey) {
br_sha1_init(shactx);
br_sha1_update(shactx, "ssh-rsa", 7); // tag
br_sha1_update(shactx, rsakey.e, rsakey.elen); // exponent
br_sha1_update(shactx, rsakey.n, rsakey.nlen); // modulus
}
*/
// If `compat` id false, adds a u32be length prefixed value to the sha1 state.
// If `compat` is true, the length will be omitted for compatibility with
// data from older versions of Tasmota.
static void sha1_update_len(br_sha1_context *shactx, const void *msg, uint32_t len, bool compat) {
uint8_t buf[] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; uint8_t buf[] = {0, 0, 0, 0};
if (!compat) { buf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xff;
buf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xff; buf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xff;
buf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xff; buf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
buf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; buf[3] = (len >> 0) & 0xff;
buf[3] = (len >> 0) & 0xff; br_sha1_update(shactx, buf, 4); // length
br_sha1_update(shactx, buf, 4); // length
}
br_sha1_update(shactx, msg, len); // message br_sha1_update(shactx, msg, len); // message
} }
// Update the received fingerprint based on the certificate's public key. // Calculate the received fingerprint based on the certificate's public key.
// If `compat` is true, an insecure version of the fingerprint will be // The public exponent and modulus are length prefixed to avoid security
// calcualted for compatibility with older versions of Tasmota. Normally, // vulnerabilities related to ambiguous serialization. Without this, an
// `compat` should be false. // attacker can generate alternative public keys which result in the same
static void pubkeyfingerprint_pubkey_fingerprint(br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *xc, bool compat) { // fingerprint, but are trivial to crack. This works because RSA keys can be
// created with more than two primes, and most numbers, even large ones, can
// be easily factored.
static void pubkeyfingerprint_pubkey_fingerprint(br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *xc) {
br_rsa_public_key rsakey = xc->ctx.pkey.key.rsa; br_rsa_public_key rsakey = xc->ctx.pkey.key.rsa;
br_sha1_context shactx; br_sha1_context shactx;
br_sha1_init(&shactx); br_sha1_init(&shactx);
sha1_update_len(&shactx, "ssh-rsa", 7, compat); // tag // The tag string doesn't really matter, but it should differ depending on
sha1_update_len(&shactx, rsakey.e, rsakey.elen, compat); // exponent // key type. Since we only support RSA for now, it's a fixed string.
sha1_update_len(&shactx, rsakey.n, rsakey.nlen, compat); // modulus sha1_update_len(&shactx, "ssh-rsa", 7); // tag
sha1_update_len(&shactx, rsakey.e, rsakey.elen); // exponent
sha1_update_len(&shactx, rsakey.n, rsakey.nlen); // modulus
br_sha1_out(&shactx, xc->pubkey_recv_fingerprint); // copy to fingerprint br_sha1_out(&shactx, xc->pubkey_recv_fingerprint); // copy to fingerprint
} }
// **** End patch Castellucci
// Callback when complete chain has been parsed. // Callback when complete chain has been parsed.
// Return 0 on validation success, !0 on validation error // Return 0 on validation success, !0 on validation error
static unsigned pubkeyfingerprint_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx) { static unsigned pubkeyfingerprint_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx) {
br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *xc = (br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *)ctx; br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *xc = (br_x509_pubkeyfingerprint_context *)ctx;
// set fingerprint status byte to zero pubkeyfingerprint_pubkey_fingerprint(xc);
// FIXME: find a better way to pass this information
xc->pubkey_recv_fingerprint[20] = 0;
// Try matching using the the new fingerprint algorithm
pubkeyfingerprint_pubkey_fingerprint(xc, false);
if (!xc->fingerprint_all) { if (!xc->fingerprint_all) {
if (0 == memcmp_P(xc->pubkey_recv_fingerprint, xc->fingerprint1, 20)) { if (0 == memcmp_P(xc->pubkey_recv_fingerprint, xc->fingerprint1, 20)) {
return 0; return 0;
@ -832,7 +820,6 @@ extern "C" {
// Default (no validation at all) or no errors in prior checks = success. // Default (no validation at all) or no errors in prior checks = success.
return 0; return 0;
} }
// **** End patch Castellucci
} }
// Return the public key from the validator (set by x509_minimal) // Return the public key from the validator (set by x509_minimal)

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@ -152,12 +152,7 @@ class WiFiClientSecure_light : public WiFiClient {
bool _insecure; // force fingerprint bool _insecure; // force fingerprint
const uint8_t *_fingerprint1; // fingerprint1 to be checked against const uint8_t *_fingerprint1; // fingerprint1 to be checked against
const uint8_t *_fingerprint2; // fingerprint2 to be checked against const uint8_t *_fingerprint2; // fingerprint2 to be checked against
// **** Start patch Castellucci
/*
uint8_t _recv_fingerprint[20]; // fingerprint received uint8_t _recv_fingerprint[20]; // fingerprint received
*/
uint8_t _recv_fingerprint[21]; // fingerprint received
// **** End patch Castellucci
unsigned char *_recvapp_buf; unsigned char *_recvapp_buf;
size_t _recvapp_len; size_t _recvapp_len;