net/packet: fix filtering of short IPv4 fragments

The fragment offset is an 8 byte offset rather than a byte offset, so
the short packet limit is now in fragment block size in order to compare
with the offset value.

The packet flags are in the first 3 bits of the flags/frags byte, and
so after conversion to a uint16 little endian value they are at the
start, not the end of the value - the mask for extracting "more
fragments" is adjusted to match this byte.

Extremely short fragments less than 80 bytes are dropped, but fragments
over 80 bytes are now accepted.

Fixes #5727

Signed-off-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
This commit is contained in:
James Tucker 2022-09-22 11:08:28 -07:00 committed by James Tucker
parent c66e15772f
commit 146f51ce76
2 changed files with 72 additions and 16 deletions

View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import (
const unknown = ipproto.Unknown
// RFC1858: prevent overlapping fragment attacks.
const minFrag = 60 + 20 // max IPv4 header + basic TCP header
const minFragBlks = (60 + 20) / 8 // max IPv4 header + basic TCP header in fragment blocks (8 bytes each)
type TCPFlag uint8
@ -152,11 +152,12 @@ func (q *Parsed) decode4(b []byte) {
// it as Unknown. We can also treat any subsequent fragment that starts
// at such a low offset as Unknown.
fragFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[6:8])
moreFrags := (fragFlags & 0x20) != 0
moreFrags := (fragFlags & 0x2000) != 0
fragOfs := fragFlags & 0x1FFF
if fragOfs == 0 {
// This is the first fragment
if moreFrags && len(sub) < minFrag {
if moreFrags && len(sub) < minFragBlks {
// Suspiciously short first fragment, dump it.
q.IPProto = unknown
return
@ -216,7 +217,7 @@ func (q *Parsed) decode4(b []byte) {
}
} else {
// This is a fragment other than the first one.
if fragOfs < minFrag {
if fragOfs < minFragBlks {
// First frag was suspiciously short, so we can't
// trust the followup either.
q.IPProto = unknown

View File

@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ func mustIPPort(s string) netip.AddrPort {
var icmp4RequestBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x27, 0xde, 0xad, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x01, 0x8c, 0x15,
// source ip
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// ICMP header
0x08, 0x00, 0x7d, 0x22,
@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ var icmp4RequestDecode = Parsed{
var icmp4ReplyBuffer = []byte{
0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x25, 0x21, 0x52, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x01, 0x49, 0x73,
// source ip
// source IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// ICMP header
0x00, 0x00, 0xe6, 0x9e,
@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ var unknownPacketDecode = Parsed{
var tcp4PacketBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x37, 0xde, 0xad, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x06, 0x49, 0x5f,
// source ip
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// TCP header with SYN, ACK set
0x00, 0x7b, 0x02, 0x37, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
@ -172,9 +172,9 @@ var tcp6RequestDecode = Parsed{
var udp4RequestBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xad, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, 0x8c, 0x01,
// source ip
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// UDP header
0x00, 0x7b, 0x02, 0x37, 0x00, 0x17, 0x72, 0x1d,
@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ var udp4RequestDecode = Parsed{
var invalid4RequestBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum. IHL field points beyond end of packet.
0x4a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0xde, 0xad, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, 0x8c, 0x01,
// source ip
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
}
@ -244,9 +244,9 @@ var udp6RequestDecode = Parsed{
var udp4ReplyBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x29, 0x21, 0x52, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x11, 0x49, 0x5f,
// source ip
// source IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// destination ip
// destination IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// UDP header
0x02, 0x37, 0x00, 0x7b, 0x00, 0x15, 0xd3, 0x9d,
@ -265,6 +265,59 @@ var udp4ReplyDecode = Parsed{
Dst: mustIPPort("5.6.7.8:123"),
}
// First TCP fragment of a packet with leading 24 bytes of 'a's
var tcp4MediumFragmentBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x20, 0x00, 0x4c, 0x2c, 0x62, 0x20, 0x00, 0x22, 0x06, 0x3a, 0x0f,
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// TCP header
0x00, 0x50, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xad, 0x60, 0x94, 0x25, 0xe4, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x80,
0x10, 0x01, 0xfd, 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0a, 0xff, 0x60,
0xfb, 0xfe, 0xba, 0x31, 0x78, 0x6a,
// data
0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61,
0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61, 0x61,
}
var tcp4MediumFragmentDecode = Parsed{
b: tcp4MediumFragmentBuffer,
subofs: 20,
dataofs: 52,
length: len(tcp4MediumFragmentBuffer),
IPVersion: 4,
IPProto: TCP,
Src: mustIPPort("1.2.3.4:80"),
Dst: mustIPPort("5.6.7.8:62348"),
TCPFlags: 0x10,
}
var tcp4ShortFragmentBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x45, 0x20, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x2c, 0x62, 0x20, 0x00, 0x22, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x4f,
// source IP
0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// destination IP
0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
// partial TCP header
0x00, 0x50, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xad, 0x60, 0x94, 0x00, 0x00,
}
var tcp4ShortFragmentDecode = Parsed{
b: tcp4ShortFragmentBuffer,
subofs: 20,
dataofs: 0,
length: len(tcp4ShortFragmentBuffer),
// short fragments are rejected (marked unknown) to avoid header attacks as described in RFC 1858
IPProto: ipproto.Unknown,
IPVersion: 4,
Src: mustIPPort("1.2.3.4:0"),
Dst: mustIPPort("5.6.7.8:0"),
}
var igmpPacketBuffer = []byte{
// IP header up to checksum
0x46, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x41, 0x22,
@ -404,6 +457,8 @@ func TestDecode(t *testing.T) {
{"invalid4", invalid4RequestBuffer, invalid4RequestDecode},
{"ipv4_tsmp", ipv4TSMPBuffer, ipv4TSMPDecode},
{"ipv4_sctp", sctpBuffer, sctpDecode},
{"ipv4_frag", tcp4MediumFragmentBuffer, tcp4MediumFragmentDecode},
{"ipv4_fragtooshort", tcp4ShortFragmentBuffer, tcp4ShortFragmentDecode},
}
for _, tt := range tests {